Widening the Divide between Them and Us? by Hameleers, Michael & Fawzi, Nayla
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=upcp20
Political Communication
ISSN: 1058-4609 (Print) 1091-7675 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upcp20
Widening the Divide between Them and Us? The
Effects of Populist Communication on Cognitive
and Affective Stereotyping in a Comparative
European Setting
Michael Hameleers & Nayla Fawzi
To cite this article: Michael Hameleers & Nayla Fawzi (2020): Widening the Divide between
Them and Us? The Effects of Populist Communication on Cognitive and Affective Stereotyping in a
Comparative European Setting, Political Communication, DOI: 10.1080/10584609.2020.1723754
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2020.1723754
© 2020 The Author(s). Published with
license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
View supplementary material 
Published online: 09 Mar 2020. Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 629 View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Widening the Divide between Them and Us? The Effects of
Populist Communication on Cognitive and Affective
Stereotyping in a Comparative European Setting
Michael Hameleersa and Nayla Fawzib
aAmsterdam School of Communication Research ASCoR, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands;
bDepartment of Communication Studies and Media Research, Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich,
Munich, Germany
ABSTRACT
To explain the global spread and electoral success of populist rheto-
ric, a growing body of research has investigated the content and
effects of populist communication. Extant research has shown that
right-wing populist communication can activate negative stereotypi-
cal portrayals toward the populist out-group. Yet, we know too little
about how exposure to populist ideas can widen the perceived
cognitive and affective divide between the people and others in
different European regions, although this Manichean view of in-
and out-groups is at the core of populist ideology. Against this
backdrop, we rely on a comparative experimental study in Western,
Eastern, and Southern European regions to investigate how exposure
to right-wing populist communication can activate the perceived
divide between the ordinary people vis-à-vis the elites and immi-
grants. Our main findings demonstrate that populist communication
in some cases widens the cognitive and emotional divide between
the people and the populist out-groups, but the magnitude of the
effects is small, and we do not find systematic patterns correspond-
ing to regions. Nevertheless, our results have important implications
for understanding the impact of populism on the cultivation of
polarized divides in a diversified European region. Populist commu-
nication may augment societal divides, but these effects are spread
across countries and only triggered by some elements of the idea-







It has been argued that populist communication by or through the media has important
effects on citizens’ cognitions, attitudes, and even behavior (e.g., Aalberg, Esser,
Reinemann, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 2017). By priming populist attitudes among recei-
vers, exposure to populist ideas in the press may make people more aligned with the
populist worldviews propagated by different politicians across the globe (e.g., Krämer,
2014). Communicating the core elements of populist communication – emphasizing an
antagonistic societal divide between the ordinary people and the culpable elites (Mudde,
2004) – may thus eventually make populist ideas more salient among the demand-side of
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voters, hereby contributing to populism’s electoral success (e.g., Hameleers, Bos, & de
Vreese, 2017).
Despite the field’s growing interest in understanding the political consequences of
populist communication (e.g., Aalberg et al., 2017; Busby, Gubler, & Hawkins, 2019;
Hameleers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2018a; Müller et al., 2017; Rooduijn, van der Brug, de
Lange, & Parlevliet, 2017; Schmuck & Matthes, 2017) – we know relatively little about the
effects of populism on polarized perceptions – or the perceived distance between the in-
group of the people and the out-group of the elites and/or “dangerous” others. Although
these perceptions are related to populist attitudes – typically understood as individual-
level support for the populist ideology (e.g., Schulz et al., 2017; Castanho Silva, Jungkunz,
Helbling, & Littvay, 2019) – they more directly align with populism’s antagonistic or
Manichean worldview. Polarized perceptions are most directly related to the negative
democratic implications associated with populism. The perceived gap between the people
and the others may result in the reinforcement of existing views, it may stimulate
confirmation-biased versus cross-cutting exposure to political views, and may therefore
trigger political behaviors that are not in line with the principles of deliberative
democracy.
Against this backdrop, this paper relies on a comparative experiment in most-different
clusters of European regions (East, West, South) to assess how populist communication
impacts the perceived distance between the ordinary people and the elites/immigrants
(also see Hameleers et al., 2018b for the experimental set-up). As extant literature already
hinted at polarization as a key political consequence of exposure to populist communica-
tion (Hameleers, Andreadis, & Reinemann, 2019; Müller et al., 2017), this paper aims to
assess if both the cognitively and emotionally experienced distance between “them” and
“us” is augmented when exposing people to the core elements of populist communication
in a most-different cases comparative setup. Do individuals feel closer to the people and
more distant from the elites and dangerous out-groups when these actors are held
responsible for causing the people’s problems?
Following the ideational approach to populism, we expect that populist cues activate
perceptions of a divide between the people and the elites in settings where populist
messages are most credible (Busby et al., 2019; Hawkins, Rovira Kaltwasser, &
Andreadis, 2018). Specifically, the activation of stereotypical representation of the people,
the elites, and the allegedly dangerous others should be most effective when these attitudes
are available as mental schemata in receivers (Bos et al., 2019; Hawkins et al., 2018). In line
with this framework of trait activation, we identify three attitudes that may in particular
predict the resonance of populist messages with preexisting schemata: (1) national identi-
fication as the extent to which people feel part of the populist in-group; (2) relative
deprivation as the perception that this in-group is deprived and threatened by the culpable
elites and immigrants; and (3) political cynicism/dissatisfaction with the government as
the extent to which people perceive the national government as successful in representing
their will. Finally, we compare the effects of populist communication in countries that are
relatively well-off (Western Europe) to countries that have faced more (economic) hard-
ships in recent years (Eastern and Southern Europe).
The main findings indicate that exposure to populist communication widens the
perceived cognitive and affective distance between the people and the elites/immigrants
in message-congruent ways in some European regions and through specific populist
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dimensions. We do not find any systematic patterns across Europe and across the
elements of the ideational core of populism. Moreover, the perceptual lenses of national
identification and relative deprivation do not affect the persuasiveness of populist mes-
sages, whereas dissatisfaction with the national government does – but only in the
Southern European region.
The Effects of Populist Communication on Cognitions and Emotions
In this paper, we take a communicative approach to the phenomenon of populism (also
see Aalberg et al., 2017; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Moffitt, 2016; Reinemann, Stanyer,
Aalberg, Esser, & de Vreese, 2019). We understand populist communication as the
expression of the ideas of populism’s (thin) ideology (Mudde, 2004; Mudde &
Kaltwasser, 2017). More specifically, populist communication expresses that the ordinary
people as an in-group are not represented by the elites in government and that the people
have a general will that should be the focus of political decision-making. Opposed to the
people as an in-group, the “corrupt” elites are held responsible for not representing the
ordinary people and for prioritizing their own interests or the needs of other groups in
society (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008). Next to stressing the divide between the people
and the elites, right-wing populism excludes “dangerous” others from the people’s in-
group (Aalberg et al., 2017; Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007).
These dangerous others are mostly seen as immigrants who are said to profit from the
scarce resources of the ordinary people whilst not contributing to the welfare state.
Extant (content analytic) research indicates that these elements of populism may be
disseminated to the people in a fragmented way (Engesser, Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 2017).
Thus, this study systematically analyzes the effects of three forms of populist communication
(also see Jagers & Walgrave, 2007): (1) anti-elitist populist communication (the thin-cored
ideology); (2) exclusionary ideas (the right-wing component that excludes immigrants from
the people) and (3) right-wing complete populism (the combination of these cues). But how
can the expression of such populist ideas by and through the media affect stereotypical
representations, and eventually, the perceived emotional and cognitive distance between the
people and the others?
As postulated by the ideational approach to populism (e.g., Busby et al., 2019; Hawkins
& Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017), populism also exists as an
individual-level attitude among voters that needs to be activated or “woken up” by factors
in the (political) context or by specific framing. In this paper, we postulate that populist
communication can be understood as such an important supply-side factor that can make
message-congruent responses more salient and in line with populist perceptions. Thus, in
line with the ideational approach to populism (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019;
Meléndez & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019), we expect that when populist frames that empha-
size a divide between us and them are credible for receivers, they can activate message-
congruent perceptions on the demand-side of voters.
In line with this approach, many scholars have investigated the effects of populist
messages on populist attitudes (e.g., Hameleers et al., 2017; Müller et al., 2017; Reinemann
et al., 2019). Populist attitudes can be understood as individual-level support for (parts of)
the ideational core of populism (e.g., Akkerman et al., 2014; Schulz et al., 2017). Because
populist attitudes are relatively stable attitudes that are not easily affected by exposure to
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single messages in people’s communication environment, the effect of populist commu-
nication should rather be understood as activating or making salient traits or schemata in
individuals that correspond to populist interpretations, such as a specific set of in- and
out-group identities (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019; Hawkins et al., 2018; Meléndez
& Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019). In this paper, we do not directly look at the effects of populist
communication on populist attitudes, but conceptualize support for, or alignment with,
elements of the populist ideology in a different, indirect way: as the perceived distance
between the in-group of the people and the out-group of the elites. As we understand
populism as a social identity frame that refers to the ordinary people whilst emphasizing
the central opposition to the corrupt elites (e.g., Bos et al., 2019; Hawkins & Rovira
Kaltwasser, 2019), we more directly assess how populism’s antagonistic or Manichean
worldview triggers or activates similar oppositional divides amongst citizens. However,
analogous to populist attitudes, such a perception of polarization between in- and out-
groups can also be regarded as a rather stable attitude, and no particularly large effects of
one populist message are to be expected. Nevertheless, we first aim to investigate whether
populist communication affects the perceived social distance between the in-group and the
elites and immigrants as populist out-groups on a perceptual level.
Populist messages may impact receivers’ stereotypical images of the people versus the
others by means of the cognitive priming of social identity (e.g., Reinemann, Matthes, &
Sheafer, 2017). The literature on trait or schemata activation and priming further indicate
that exposure to ideas expressing conceptions of the in-group and the out-group may
activate message-congruent mental maps among receivers (Brewer & Nakamura, 1984).
Extant research indicates that populist communication cumulatively primes negative
associations of out-groups (i.e., the elites or immigrants) by attributing negative attributes
to these others whilst crediting the people (Arendt, 2013; Matthes & Schmuck, 2017).
As a consequence of repeated exposure to positive stereotypes of the people and
negative stereotypes of the elites and immigrants, these stereotypes may become chroni-
cally accessible among receivers of populist media content (Hameleers et al., 2017). Based
on the theoretical framework of negative stereotyping and threat activation, we therefore
hypothesize that exposure to populist communication primes positive stereotypes toward
the in-group of the people and negative stereotypes of the out-group held responsible,
hereby widening the perceived cognitive divide between the people and the elites (H1a)
and immigrants (H1b).
Populist cues may also elicit emotional responses among receivers (Wirz, 2018).
Populism can be regarded as an inherently moralized discourse: It communicates
a Manichean view on socio-political reality by juxtaposing the “good” ordinary people
to the “evil” elites (e.g., Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019; Mudde, 2004). Moral
references can have a strong effect on voters’ political evaluations and emotional responses
(e.g., Horberg, Oveis, & Keltner, 2011). The references to different types of moral content
as explicated in the Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) also illustrate a link between
referring to the elites’ harm and unfairness – central in populism’s Manichean divide –
and negative emotional responses toward the “evil” outsider (Graham et al., 2013). Moral
references to harm (i.e., the elites that deprive the people) may connect to emotional
suffering (Graham et al., 2013). It can thus be expected that exposure to moral language in
populist communication evokes emotional responses in receivers.
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Populism emphasizes in-group threat and relative deprivation of the people, which may
also correspond to the activation of intergroup emotions (Smith & Mackie, 2008). More
specifically, populist communication may cultivate positive feelings toward the in-group of
the people whilst resulting in anger and fear toward the out-groups that allegedly threaten
the people (Smith & Mackie, 2008). Thus, exposure to populist communication may not
only foster a cognitive distance between the people and the others, it may also augment an
affective divide by promoting more positive feelings toward the ordinary people who are
innocent and more negative feelings toward the culpable elites and/or immigrants who are
responsible for the problems of the ordinary people. We therefore hypothesize that
exposure to populist communication augments the affective divide between the ordinary
people and the elites (H2a) and immigrants (H2b).
Perceptual Screens Corresponding to the Perceived Distance between Them and Us
Populist cues are most likely to successfully activate (elements of) populism when these
messages resonate with the context and/or specific framing of these messages (e.g., Busby
et al., 2019; Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019). We believe this context should not only
be regarded as national- or context-level factors (i.e., economic situations) but also as
attitudes and perceptions on the individual level. Recent research showed that populist
attitudes do have the potential to moderate effects on behavior, such as individual’s
intention for populist voting and populist expression, albeit not always in line with
theoretical assumptions (Busby et al., 2019; Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018). In
contrast to populist attitudes that are seen as latent demand-side perceptions that must
be activated and are less consciously held (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019), we
decided to focus on more stable predispositions.
We specifically propose three beliefs that are relevant for the activation of the perceived
distance between the people as an in-group and the elites/dangerous others as an out-
group: (1) national identification, (2) relative deprivation, and (3) political cynicism/
dissatisfaction. It is plausible to assume that these attitudes are related to populist world-
views, as they correspond to the perceived closeness to the heartland of the ordinary
people (national identification), the moral perspective of this in-group to be deprived of
what it deserves by other groups in society (relative deprivation), and the extent to which
the elites are a credible scapegoat for the problems experienced by the ordinary people
(political dissatisfaction). In-group attachment, relative deprivation, and distrusting the
elites should make populist arguments more personally relevant and credible.
National identification relates to the people’s closeness to the in-group that is typically
emphasized in right-wing populist communication: the ordinary or native people that are
part of the heartland – an imagined community in which the ordinary people share key
values and a monolithic will (Taggart, 2000). More specifically, (right-wing) populist
communication should resonate most among citizens who experience a stronger bond
with the national identity (e.g., Aalberg et al., 2017; Hameleers et al., 2017). For these
people, (right-wing) populism’s cultivation of belonging to the nativist in-group should be
most credible. Social identity framing further postulates that social identity frames that
refer to an in-group (i.e., the ordinary or native people) are most effective when people
actually identify with this group (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Against this
backdrop, we hypothesize that the effects of populist communication on the perceived
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cognitive distance between the in-group and the elite (H3a) and the in-group and
immigrants (H3b) are strongest when people experience closeness to the in-group of the
national people. We assume a similar moderation effect of national identification on the
effect of populist communication on the affective distance between the in-group and the
elite (H3c) and the in-group and immigrants (H3d).
People who experience that they have lost something they are morally entitled to may
be affected most by populist ideas that respond to the sense of being left behind, for
example, by the corrupt elites who only care for themselves. Populism essentially revolves
around cultivating a divide between the ordinary people and the corrupt elites and/or
dangerous others that are accused of depriving the ordinary people (Albertazzi &
McDonnell, 2008). Relative deprivation should thus make people more receptive to
populist ideas: the more people believe that the elites are taking away resources that
should belong to the ordinary people, or the more immigrants are seen as depriving the
people of cultural or material prosperity, the more personally relevant the Manichean
outlook emphasized in populism should be. Indeed, recent empirical research indicates
that perceptions of relative deprivation can create a discursive opportunity structure that
makes populist ideas stick among receivers (e.g., Bos et al., 2019; Elchardus & Spruyt,
2016; Hameleers et al., 2018a). Relative deprivation can be defined as the experience that
other groups in society are profiting relatively more than the in-group, resulting in the
belief that the in-group is worse off whereas it is morally entitled to receive more than
other groups in society (e.g., Elchardus & Spruyt, 2016; Hameleers et al., 2018a).
Populist communication should thus be more personally relevant and “real” when
people feel more deprived. This expectation again corresponds with social identity fram-
ing: social identity frames are more effective when receivers experience more injustice that
can be attributed credibly to a scapegoated outsider (e.g., Gamson, 1992). The elites as
a corrupt out-group, and the exclusion of immigrants in right-wing populism is thus more
credible and relevant when people believe their in-group is actually worse off than other
groups. In line with this reasoning, we hypothesize that the stronger the feelings of relative
deprivation, the stronger the effects of populist communication on the perceived cognitive
distance between the in-group and the elite (H4a) and immigrants (H4b) as well as on the
perceived affective distance between the in-group and the elite (H4c) and immi-
grants (H4d).
Finally, the central populist argument that the elites are unresponsive and corrupt may
especially activate negative out-group stereotypes of the elites and “dangerous” others
prioritized by the elites among people who distrust politics and are dissatisfied with the
political elites governing the country. The stronger the people’s dissatisfaction with the
established political order, the more likely populist messages correspond to their negative
associations of the elites governing the country. In line with this, Bos, van der Brug, and
de Vreese (2013) found that populist messages have stronger effects among politically
cynical or distrusting people. Moreover, the more dissatisfied people are with politics, the
more likely they are to perceive populist out-groups as a threat – as politicians in
government are not able to deal with issues such as immigration or crime. The perceptual
screens of people with less favorable attitudes toward politicians or the functioning of the
national political system should thus align with the expression of populist ideas.
Therefore, we hypothesize that the effects of populist communication on augmenting
the cognitive boundary between the in-group and the elites (H5a) and immigrants (H5b),
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as well as the affective boundary between the in-group and the elites (H5c) and immi-
grants (H5d), are strongest for participants with higher levels of distrust in/dissatisfaction
with the political elites governing their countries.
The Resonance of Populist Communication with Country-Level Opportunity
Structures
Situated in a European setting where populist ideas on the left and right have been
successful to different extents, we aim to assess how the effects of populist communication
are similar or different across three clusters of European regions: Eastern, Western, and
Southern Europe. Hence, as theoretically postulated in the ideational approach, national
and political contexts can offer an important context for the activation of populist world-
views (e.g., Andreadis, Hawkins, Llamazares, & Singer, 2019; Hawkins et al., 2018).
Populist messages that emphasize the elites’ corruption may, for example, be most
effective under conditions of failed representation (Bornschier, 2019; Hawkins & Rovira
Kaltwasser, 2019).
These clusters are compared for two reasons. First, extant research has mainly focused
on the effects of populist communication in Western Europe (Bos et al., 2013; Schmuck &
Matthes, 2017). Although we know that populist ideas are persuasive in Western
European countries that have witnessed the rise of electorally successful right-wing popu-
list parties, we know too little about the transferability of these findings to other settings.
Although left-wing populism has recently been electorally successful in Southern Europe,
research on the effects of populist communication in this setting is scarce. Second,
country-level opportunity structures that are different between clusters, such as the level
of unemployment, immigration, or the severity of the recent economic recession, may
impact the effects of populist communication. Hence, just as populist communication may
be perceived as more personally relevant when it resonates with people’s perceptual
screens, populist ideas that blame the elites for the people’s problems may be more
relevant for citizens in countries that have faced relatively more economic hardships.
Together, the three country clusters inform a so-called most-different comparative
design: countries with varying levels of opportunity structures for populist communication
are compared to assess the stability of populism’s persuasiveness in different settings. In
this setting, the following research question is forwarded: To what extent are the effects of
populist communication similar in Eastern, Western and Southern European regions?
Method
Experimental Design and Stimuli
The results reported in this paper are based on a one-factor between-subjects experiment
with four different conditions (see Hameleers et al., 2018b for more details on the project).
The typology of populist communication manipulated in the experiment was based on
Jagers and Walgrave (2007). In contrast to previous experiments on the effects of populist
rhetoric, we systematically manipulated the three dimensions of populist communication
and compared the effects of different populist cues to a control group: (1) anti-elitist
populist communication, (2) excluding populism, (3) complete right-wing populism and
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(4) a neutral control condition. All other factors were held constant between conditions
and countries.
The central topic of all articles was a predicted decline of purchasing power in the
respective countries. All articles had the same fictional source: a European-level founda-
tion that explained the prediction and potential causes. These causes differed between the
conditions. In the anti-elite populist conditions, a central divide between the innocent
ordinary people and the corrupt elites who caused the future decline in purchasing power
was stressed. In the exclusionist condition, the ordinary people were juxtaposed to the
“dangerous” others: immigrants who profited from the people’s welfare, causing the
negative development of declining purchasing power. The complete (right-wing) populist
condition combined these cues: the ordinary people were framed in opposition to the
corrupt elites who failed to represent the people and the dangerous immigrants who were
prioritized and allowed to profit from the people. All articles were similar in length and
layout. An extensive pilot test (Greece in the Southern cluster and Germany in the
Western cluster, N = 1,829) was used to test the design and stimuli. Based on the
credibility scores of the pilot test, the stimuli were further streamlined (see Appendix
A for the English template). Pilot testing showed that the manipulations worked and that
the message was perceived as credible – and indicative of a populist worldview corre-
sponding to the manipulations of different types of populism.
Sample
The inclusion and exclusion criteria of countries aimed for maximum variety between
clusters and minimal differences within clusters. The Western cluster consisted of countries
that are geographically close and relatively similar in terms of unemployment rates, overall
level of education, immigration, and overall economic situation: Austria, Germany, and the
Netherlands. The salience of the recent economic recession and higher levels of unemploy-
ment were the central grouping criteria for the Southern cluster. In this cluster, Italy, Spain
and Greece were included. Finally, in the Eastern European cluster, levels of distrust in the
political establishment, alleged corruption, and the non-immigration basis of exclusionism
(the debate in these countries revolves more around ethic cleavages than the influx of
migrants) were the rationale for inclusion: Romania and Poland were included in this cluster.
In all eight countries, the data were collected between January and April 2017. With the
exception of Greece and Romania,1 Survey Sampling International/Research Now col-
lected the data and applied the sampling criteria. In all countries, the exact same sampling
criteria were applied. More specifically, all countries aimed for maximum varied samples
that reflected the country’s census data regarding the distributions of age, gender, and
education. The total number of completes per country are as follows: Austria (566),
Germany (501), Greece (555), Italy (529), Poland (683), Romania (750), Spain (500),
and the Netherlands (465).2 Although the country-level sample sizes are substantially
smaller than the country clusters, we assessed that there was sufficient power to detect
significant differences between the four conditions – even at lower levels of significance (p
< .001). An overview of sample characteristics is provided in Table B1 of the online
appendix. Four quality criteria (completion time, straight lining, item nonresponse and
manipulation checks) were used as indicators for data cleaning (see Hameleers et al.,
2018b for a discussion of the cleaning process).
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Procedure
The experiment was conducted online in all eight countries. Participants had to give their
informed consent to start the questionnaire. Before exposure to the stimuli, sociodemo-
graphic and moderator variables were collected. Respondents then were randomly
assigned to one of the four conditions and asked to read the news article which was
visible for at least 20 seconds. The four conditions do not differ significantly with regard to
age (F3, 4484 = .998, p = .392), gender (Χ
2(3) = .694, p = .875), education (Χ2(3) = 4.806, p
= .569), political interest (F3, 4538 = .461, p = .709) and ideology (F3, 4009 = .115, p = .951).
The measurement of the dependent variables and manipulation check followed. The
questionnaire ended with a debriefing.
Dependent Variables
The perceived distance between the ordinary people as an in-group and the elites or
immigrants as out-groups was measured in an indirect and innovative way. It is based on
two different measurements: the distance between stereotypical beliefs about these groups
(cognitive distance) and the different emotional responses toward the people and the
others (affective distance). Respondents were asked to assess both the in-group (most
people in [name of the country], the political elite and immigrants with regard to four
stereotypical attributes (trustworthy – untrustworthy, hardworking – lazy, honest – dis-
honest, sympathetic – unsympathetic, 7-point scale) and with regard to their feelings
(1 = negative, 7 = positive, people: M = 4.80, SD = 1.35; politicians: M = 2.64, SD = 1.55;
immigrants: M = 3.65, SD = 1.63). The four attributes formed a reliable mean index for
each group (people: M = 4.59, SD = 1.30; α = .873; politicians: M = 2.73, SD = 1.49;
α = .935; immigrants: M = 3.74, SD = 1.49; α = .931). The perceived distance between the
people and the out-groups was measured by calculating the individual difference between
the perceived stereotype of the in- and the two out-groups which lead to our dependent
variables (1) cognitive distance between the people and the elite (M = 1.86, SD = 1.62) and
(2) cognitive distance between the people and immigrants (M = .85, SD = 1.72). The
affective distance between (3) the people and the elite (M = 2.16, SD = 1.83) and (4) the
people and immigrants (M = 1.15, SD = 1.81) was calculated in the same way based on the
assessed feelings toward these groups. This indirect measurement of the perceived distance
between in- and out-groups should be better able to detect cognitive and affective
stereotypical perceptions than a direct question.
Moderators
In-group attachment was measured with a three-item scale (i.e., I have a strong sense of
belonging to my [nationality], M = 4.45, SD = 1.46, Cronbach’s alpha = .76). Perceived
relative deprivation was also tapped with a three-item scale (i.e., If we need anything from
the government, ordinary people like me always have to wait longer than others, M = 4.33,
SD = 1.60, Cronbach’s alpha = .83). Finally, perceptions of political dissatisfaction/cyni-
cism were measured with one (reverse-coded) item: “Thinking about your government,
how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job?” (1 = extremely dissatisfied,
7 = extremely satisfied).
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Although we did not formulate hypotheses on the relationship between left- and right-
wing ideology (or extremity), political interest and education, we do control for these
variables as robustness checks, because previous literature has indicated that these factors
may influence support for populist ideology (e.g., Aalberg et al., 2017). Left-right self-
placement was recoded into ideological extremity by taking the two lowest values on the
ten-point scale as a proxy for left-wing extremity and the two highest values as an
indicator of right-wing extremity (± 1.5 SD from the mean). Political interest was
measured with the item “How much would you say you are interested in politics and
current affairs in general?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). The education variable was
recoded into a standardized ESS scale in all countries.
Manipulation Checks
Five statements checked whether our manipulation of the article was successful.
Independent samples t-tests show that the three populism conditions significantly differ
from the control group in terms of the people centrism dimension. Compared to the control
group, respondents who saw one of the three populist versions of the article agreed more
that the article described (1) the people of the country as hardworking (F1, 4440 = 372.38,
p = .000), (2) a threat to the well-being of the national citizens (F1, 4457 = 30.80, p = .000),
and (3) that the nation’s citizens will be affected by the economic developments described
(F1, 4455 = 8.91, p = .003). Moreover, the anti-elitist condition differs significantly from the
other conditions in the extent to which respondents ascribe responsibility for the decline of
the purchasing power to politicians (F1, 4449 = 295.10, p = .000). The two anti-immigrant
conditions differ significantly from the anti-elitist and control group in the extent to which
they blame immigrants for decline of the purchasing power (F1, 4446 = 1394.25, p = .000).
Results
Before testing our hypotheses, we conducted a number of robustness checks. Ideology and
prior attitudes in line with populist messages may correspond to the perceived cognitive
and affective divide between the people and the others. For this reason, we controlled for
(1) left- and right-wing ideological predispositions, (2) political interest and (3) education
in all analyses. Including these factors did not change any of the results. However, we do
find some associations between these controls and perceived cognitive and affective
divides. More specifically, ideological extremity of the right wing corresponded to
a perceived divide between the people and the elites in Eastern Europe (B = .72,
SE = .14, p < .001). In Southern Europe, left- wing ideological extremity corresponded
to a weaker cognitive divide between the people and immigrants (B = − .38, SE = .13, p
< .01), whereas right-wing extremity increased this gap (B = .58, SE = .15, p < .001). In this
country cluster, political interest also reduced the gap between immigrants and the people
(B = − .06, SE = .03, p < .05). Similar results were found for Western Europe. In Eastern
Europe, however, extreme right-wing issue positions corresponded to a wider perceived
gap between the people and immigrants (B = .71, SE = .15, p < .001).
Regarding the affective divide between the people and the elites, results show that
higher-educated participants in Eastern Europe perceive a stronger emotional cleavage
than lower-educated participants (B = .26, SE = .07, p < .001). In Southern Europe, only
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ideology plays a role: the extreme right-wing participants perceive the gap to be larger
(B = .41, SE = .16, p < .05). Finally, regarding the affective divide between people and
immigrants, extreme right-wing participants in Western Europe perceived the gap to be
wider (B = .84, SE = .18, p < .001), whereas the extreme left perceived it to be smaller
(B = − .64, SE = .13, p < .001). Similar effects were found in Southern Europe, whereas
these perceptions did not play a role in Eastern Europe.
We find no interaction effects between exposure to populist communication and
education, ideology, or political interest. As robustness checks, we corrected for the
number of estimates – and assessed whether the effects are similar to non-significant
results we excluded from the models. We further analyzed less complicated models in
which we looked at the impact of the moderators separately. Again, our findings remain
robust. For reasons of parsimony, we do not include all control factors in the models
testing the hypotheses in the next sections.
The Effects of Populist Communication on the Cognitive Them-Us Divide
We first hypothesized that exposure to populist communication would activate message-
congruent stereotypical portrayals of the in-group and out-group, augmenting the divide
between the ordinary people and the others (H1). Regarding the perceived cognitive distance
between the people and the elites (H1a), this hypothesis is only supported in the Western
European setting (Table 1, Model I). More specifically, exposure to anti-elitist populist
messages augments the divide between positive stereotypical images of the ordinary people
and negative mental schemata toward the elites. In Eastern and Southern Europe, the
stereotypical divide between the people and the elites is not significantly affected by exposure
to populist communication, albeit the effects point in a similar direction.
Looking at the effects of right-wing populist communication on the activation of
message-congruent perceived divides between ordinary people and immigrants,
Hypothesis 1b is supported in both the Western and Southern European contexts
(Table 2, Model I). More specifically, in Western Europe, messages that attribute blame
to immigrants widen the perceived cleavage between positive mental images of the
ordinary people and negative stereotypical schemata of immigrants. However, messages
that blame both immigrants and politicians (complete right-wing populism) do not have
this effect. In the Southern European cluster, both exclusionary and complete right-wing
populist communication activate the perceived cognitive divide between the ordinary
people and immigrants. In these countries, the effects are stronger than in Western
Europe. Although the effects fail to reach the traditional thresholds of statistical signifi-
cance, exclusionary populism in Eastern Europe also augments the gap between the people
and immigrants. Taken together, the results provide partial support for H1a and H1b:
populist messages can activate positive in-group stereotypes and negative out-group
stereotypes, but the effects partially depend on the country cluster. Here, it should be
emphasized that the effect sizes are modest at best (also see the explained variance of the
models in Tables 1 and 2). Although mere exposure to populist ideas may widen the gap







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Populist Communication and the Emotional Distance between the People and
Others
In the next step, the effects of populist communication on the emotional cleavage between
the ordinary people and the elites (Table 3) and immigrants (Table 4) were assessed.
Again, the results depended on the country cluster. Regarding the activation of an affective
cleavage between the ordinary people and the elites (H2a), only exposure to complete
populist ideas in the Eastern European cluster significantly strengthened the emotional
distance between the people and the elites (Table 3, Model I). These results only yield
limited support for H2a. Exposure to populist ideas that express a divide between the elites
and the people may strengthen the emotional distance between them and us, but this is
also limited to the type of populism and the region: complete right-wing populist com-
munication in Eastern Europe.
Looking at the effects of populist communication and the activation of an affective
divide between ordinary people and immigrants (Table 4), the results indicate that
populism’s effects are not similar across countries. In Western Europe, exposure to
excluding populist ideas strengthens the message-congruent cleavage between ordinary
people and immigrants. Exposure to both anti-elite and anti-immigrant messages does not
have this effect (Table 4, Model I). In Eastern Europe, the combination of anti-elitism and
excluding populism activates an emotional cleavage between the people and immigrants
(Table 4, Model I). Populist messages do not unconditionally activate emotional bound-
aries in Southern European countries. Against this backdrop, we found partial support for
H2b. The emotional cleavage between people and immigrants may be strengthened as
a consequence of exposure to message-congruent excluding or complete right-wing
populism, but these effects apply to the Eastern and Western European country cluster
only. Effect sizes are small, and the overall explained variance of exposure to populist
communication on affective divides in society is marginal.
The Contingency of Populism’s Effects on Perceptual Screens
Although the results are generally supportive of the alignment of national identification,
perceived deprivation and political dissatisfaction with the perceived divide between the
ordinary people and the others in all country clusters (Table 1 through 4, Model II), the
interaction effects of preexisting attitudes and exposure to congruent populist ideas are
less universal and persistent. First, in all three country clusters, the level of identification
with the in-group of the ordinary people does not moderate the effects of populist
communication on the cognitive divide between the people and the two outgroups,
which refutes H3a and H3b (Tables 1 and 2, Modell III). The interaction effect of exposure
to populist communication and relative deprivation (H4a) and political dissatisfaction
(H5a), respectively, on the cognitive divide between the people and the elites is only
significant and positive in Southern Europe, and only for anti-elitist populist communica-
tion (Table 1, Model III). With regard to the cognitive divide between in-group and
immigrants, there is no interaction effect of relative deprivation, thus H4b cannot be
supported. Finally, the effects of all populist cues on the stereotypical distance between the
people and immigrants are strongest for citizens with more cynical perceptions toward the
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establishment; however, this effect can again only be found in Southern Europe (Table 2,
Model III). This provides partial support for H5b.
Regarding the role of participants’ perceptual screens on the persuasiveness of populist
communication on affective boundaries, the results only offer limited support for
a conditional effect of populist cues. Again, there is no interaction effect of national
identification with regard to the affective divide between in-group and elites (H3c, Table
3, Modell III) and immigrants (H3d, Table 4, Modell III). Relative deprivation only
significantly affects the emotional responses to populist ideas in Eastern Europe, but it
does so in a negative way (Table 4 and Table 4, Model III). Contrary to the expectations
formulated under H4c and H4d, this means the more people in Eastern Europe feel
deprived, the weaker the effects of populist communication on the emotional boundary
between the people and the elites/immigrants. Next, we find a significant and positive two-
way interaction effect of dissatisfaction and excluding populism on the perceived affective
divide between the people and immigrants in Western Europe and a significant two-way
positive interaction effect of anti-elitist populist communication and cynicism on the
divide between the people and immigrants in Southern Europe, which provides some
support for H5c (Table 4, Model III). However, there is no interaction effect of cynicism as
for the affective divide between in-group and elites.
Together, the expectation that the effects of populist communication on cognitive and
emotional perceived boundaries between the people and the others are contingent on
national identification (H3a-d), relative deprivation (H4a-d) or political dissatisfaction
(H5a-b) finds only limited support in the data. Only political dissatisfaction may play
a role, but these effects are largely limited to Southern European countries.
Discussion
Experimental research has indicated that exposure to populist ideas can have implications
on the individual-level support of populist ideas (e.g., Bos et al., 2013; Busby et al., 2019;
Hameleers et al., 2018b; Schmuck & Matthes, 2017). Yet, we know too little about the
effects of populist communication on the perceived cognitive and affective divide between
the ordinary people as an in-group and the elites or immigrants as out-groups. Can
exposure to populist ideas augment the divide between the people and others, hereby
potentially fostering polarized divides in European societies?
To answer this question, we relied on a multi-country experiment (N = 4,498) in which
populist communication was manipulated along the lines of Jagers and Walgrave’s (2007)
empirically established conceptualization of (1) anti-elitist populist communication; (2)
exclusionism and (3) complete right-wing populist communication. We included eight
countries from Eastern, Western and Southern Europe to extend prior experimental
studies that mainly focused on single cases or two-country comparisons. The main results
indicate that exposure to populist communication has the potential to widen the cognitive
and affective cleavage between the people as an in-group and the elites and immigrants as
populist out-group, but only in some country clusters and depending on the framing of
the populist dimension. Cognitive stereotypical divides between the people and the elites
were only affected by anti-elitist populism in Western Europe, and the divide between
native people and immigrants was only affected by excluding and complete right-wing
populism in Western and Southern Europe.
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Message-congruent affective boundaries between the in-group of the native people and
the out-groups of the elites and immigrants were only activated by exposure to complete
right-wing populism (Eastern Europe) or exclusionary populism (Western Europe).
Populist cues did not have an impact on emotional boundaries in Southern European
countries, nor did the “thin” ideological core of populism (Mudde, 2004) activate the
emotional distance between the innocent native people and culpable others. All in all,
finding only a few effects of populist messages on a Manichean perception between in-
group and out-groups, our study indicates that such populist attitudes are even more
stable and manifest than has been assumed previously. Those attitudes mainly do not get
activated by one single message. This is in line with previous experimental studies
analyzing the effects of populist messages on populist attitudes (e.g., Andreadis,
Cremonesi, Kartsounidou, Kasprowicz, & Hess, 2019).
We expected the effects of populist communication would be partially contingent upon
the resonance of populist ideas with perceptual screens related to closeness to the in-group
or distance toward the out-groups. However, only the level of dissatisfaction with the
national elites in government had an impact on the persuasiveness of populist commu-
nication, and this effect was again not consistent across populist cues or country clusters.
More specifically, the level of dissatisfaction with the elites in government only played
a significant and consistent role in Southern Europe. This finding may be explained based
on the resonance with populist communication and the level of dissatisfaction in Southern
Europe at the time of the study. The Southern European countries – Greece, Italy and
Spain – were still dealing with the implications of the economic recession, and the elites in
national government in those countries were under fierce attack for not solving this issue
that threatened the native people. In line with the theoretical premises of the effectiveness
of social identity frames, it can be argued that scapegoating the elites needs to be credible
and personally relevant to have an effect (e.g., Gamson, 1992). In the case of the Southern
European countries, populist blame attributions were most personally relevant and cred-
ible for citizens who distrusted and disapproved of the political elites in their countries.
In country clusters where scapegoats are most accessible in receivers’ schemata, popu-
list blame attributions should thus be most effective. These findings support the notion
that populist communication is most effective when it resonates with real-life, contextual-
level opportunity structures (e.g., Aalberg et al., 2017; Ernst, Esser, Blassnig, & Engesser,
2018; Reinemann et al., 2019).
Although a comprehensive, empirical-based explanation of all country differences
reaches beyond the scope of this paper, we can at least arrive at some explanations for
the non-universal effects of populist messages throughout Europe. One explanation is the
success of populist parties in the different countries and the amount of populist messages
recipients are regularly exposed to. The more this is the case, the less pronounced effects
one might find for exposure to a single article, as recipients are familiar with those
messages. In contrast, in several countries we analyzed, such as Spain or Greece, left-
wing populism is more successful and anti-immigrant discourse less common than in
countries from the Western cluster. This also holds for the Eastern countries where
immigration is of less importance than in the other two clusters.
In Western European countries, anti-elitism and anti-immigration cues are highly
salient in political discourse and public opinion (Aalberg et al., 2017) – which may explain
why both anti-elite and anti-immigrant stereotypes can be directly affected by populist
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communication in this cluster. Likewise, excluding and complete right-wing populism
may be persuasive in Southern Europe as countries in this region have witnessed real-life
consequences of the refugee crisis that hit Europe at the time of the data collection.
Moreover, the country-level factors of dissatisfaction with the elite (partially related to the
way in which politicians deal with the migrant crisis) and perceived corruption may
explain why the effects of anti-elitism are contingent upon dissatisfaction with the elites
in this, but not the other regions. Although immigrants may be a less salient populist out-
group in Eastern Europe, other “dangerous” others are frequently scapegoated in this
cluster (e.g., Aalberg et al., 2017) – which may explain why complete populism affects an
emotional cleavage between the people and immigrants in Eastern Europe.
Our results have important social and political implications. In many European countries,
populists try to undermine liberal democracy and its democratic values, such as pluralism. This
experiment showed that a populist ideology can, under some conditions, spread to perceived
stereotypical divides on the demand-side of citizens (also see e.g., Müller et al., 2017). Thus,
populists’ constant attacks of the political elite and social out-groups do, to some extent, lead to
a polarized perception of these groups and the in-group. These findings support recent work by
scholars that evaluate populism as a threat to democracy, as it boosts group-relatedmisanthropy,
anti-pluralist attitudes and political dissatisfaction cynicism among the public (e.g., Waisbord,
2018). As the effects of populist messages resonate more among cynical recipients, there is a risk
of a downward spiral of cynicism. The mainstreaming of especially right-wing populist ideology
in several European countries holds the danger of strengthening these effects.
This study has several limitations that at the same time provide a starting point for future
research. First, by focusing on immigrants as a populist out-group, this experiment only
analyzed the effects of right-wing populism. For left-wing populist out-groups, effects might
look very different. Second, there are some limitations with regard to our measurement. In
terms of political cynicism, we had to rely on a single-item measurement, which might limit
its validity and reliability. Moreover, our measurement of stereotypical and emotional
perceptions of the in-group referred to “most people in country X”. Thus, it predefined for
every respondent who the in-group represents and did not account for individuals’ different
understandings of belonging. Moreover, research indeed showed that populist messages have
contradictory effects for populist and non-populist citizens (Busby et al., 2019; Müller et al.,
2017). Consequently, future research should account for populist attitudes as individual
predisposition and analyze whether the perceived distance between the people and the
populist outgroups becomes larger among populist citizens through exposure to populism
whilst those messages do not resonate among non-populists. In addition, as populist attitudes
may preexist as schemata among receivers that are activated by the context or cues in people’s
environment (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019), we suggest future research to look at
both preexisting populist schemata and the activation of these perceptions – as well as
contextual factors that make populist frames more effective. Recent research has made
a start in analyzing the moderating role of populist attitudes for populist voting (Van
Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018) and populist expressions (Busby et al., 2019). This experiment
only tested the effect of one single message at one single point of time, which limits its
external validity. In reality, recipients in many European countries are regularly exposed to
populist actors who scapegoat the elites or immigrants. Future research should therefore test
whether repeated frames are more likely to activate stereotypical divides between in- and out-
groups. Finally, we only varied the content of the article, not the image. It would be
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interesting to study the effects of populist depictions in pictures as visual communication,
e.g., memes, often used by populist and extremist actors in social media.
Despite these limitations, this study is the first to investigate the effects of populist
communication on the perceived cognitive and affective divide between the people and the
others in different European regions – hereby demonstrating that exposure to populist
messages may foster polarized divides in society. As a key democratic implication,
repeated exposure to populist communication may enhance support for populist political
parties that cultivate a cognitive and emotional Manichean opposition between them and
us in their party communication and rhetoric.
Notes
1. In Greece, data were collected via a panel consisting of a national database of voluntary
contributors maintained by the School of Political Sciences, Aristotle University of
Thessaloniki; Romania worked with Questia.
2. The original experiment is a 3 × 2 between-subject design with two control groups which has
been conducted in 15 countries (Hameleers et al., 2018b). It investigates framing effects of the
national in-group, two horizontal (immigrants and the wealthy) and one vertical (the political
elite) out-groups on several attitudinal and affective outcomes. Based on the research interest
of this paper, we only focus on (1) two out-groups: the political elite and immigrants and (2)
on those countries to whom our criteria described above applied.
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